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"He who awaits much can expect little." -Gabriel Garcia Marquez
While many interpret Garcia Marquez' statement as a call to action and a criticism of procrastination, an alternate reading of the Nobel laureate's axiom is that if one expects too much from a situation or a course of action, he is certain to be disappointed. In assessing past U.S. policy towards Colombia and -more importantly -in attempting to chart its future, the strategist must be careful not to expect too much. Above all, he must resist the frequently self-imposed mandate of American policymaking "to fix" Colombia. Colombia's internal political conflict, the endemic violence and grave humanitarian crises it has spawned, and the destabilizing narco-trafficking and terrorism that have emerged from it over the past fifty years cannot be definitively fixed or solved by U.S. policy.
However, the strategist cannot simply accept to contain Colombia, since the nature of the Colombian threat is neither the result of conflicting ideology nor of the Colombian state's willful defiance or opposition to U.S. interests. In a more practical vein, many of the threats emanating from Colombia can be substantially mitigated by a strategy of sustained U.S. engagement. Moreover, it is in the national interest to do so, since Colombia's internal woes have direct and devastating implications for U.S. domestic security. The following analysis will argue that current U.S. support for Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's Defense and Democratic Security Strategy is the appropriate policy vehicle for making progress towards our long-term strategic goals in Colombia. However, like multigenerational conflicts in the Middle East, Northern Ireland and other regions, Colombia's civil war, its illegal armed groups and their drug trafficking fellow travelers will not be pacified anytime soon. We should be mindful of Garcia Marquez' injunction not to expect too much, while at the same time admitting to ourselves that we must spend more. 3 At a time when it has again become au courant to speak of our nation's "blood and treasure," the direct social costs of illicit drug consumption are sufficiently grave to classify narcotrafficking from Colombia as a serious threat to national well-being.
Beyond the obvious deleterious effects of the drug trade in the United States, the assault on the Colombian state by internal narco-terrorist organizations represents a threat to the Andean region.
Well known "spillover" effects on Colombia's neighbors place strains on those governments to deliver on the promises of democratic governance, leading populist voices in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela to call for authoritarian solutions to public security and crime issues. The October 17 resignation of Bolivian President Sanchez de Lozada following weeks of violent protests engineered by pro-coca growing, populist elements is only the latest example of this instability. Regional analyst Eduardo Gamarra quickly posited that the U.S. failure to provide sufficient funding for alternative development in conjunction with its aggressive coca eradication support was at the core of Sanchez' failed presidency. 4 Beyond Bolivia and throughout the Andes, atavistic cries for non-or pseudodemocratic solutions to law and order problems are manifest and constitute a particularly worrisome trend in a region struggling to consolidate its nascent democracies.
A less tangible but no less important factor in crafting the U.S. approach to Colombia is the credibility of U.S. leadership and support for democracy in the region. In strict humanitarian terms, the crisis that Colombia has witnessed over many years justifies U.S. engagement. 7 While this paper will not discuss the demand reduction aspects of a comprehensive engagement strategy with Colombia, it imperative to note that they are the domestic sine qua non upon which any international course of action must be predicated. It is also the seeming intractability of demand reduction that requires a realistic and limited iteration of national objectives in Colombia. As one former Colombian public official commented, "We won't have peace in our country until you stop putting this stuff up your nose in your country." 8 The stark truth is that our Colombia policy has historically suffered a credibility gap in Colombia, where we are perceived as hard on foreign suppliers but soft on our domestic consumers. clarity" in terms of how the U.S. is framing its engagement with Colombia. 9 The psychological effects of September 11 on the American public and the Bush Administration's re-ordering of national security priorities to focus on homeland security and counter terrorism made possible a significant paradigm shift in U.S. thinking about Colombia. More than one
Old Threats Through a New
Colombian has observed the irony that "your own blood letting has finally given us both an opportunity to look at this threat in its real multidimensional setting." 10 After years of maintaining an artificial policy firewall between support for Colombian counter drug programs and a prohibition on aid to GOC counter insurgency efforts, even when evidence indicated that guerrillas had become integral to drug trafficking, the Bush Administration finally recognized the interwoven nature of this reality in its NSS. • Guarantee the security, human rights and freedom of all Colombians • Consolidate state control over national territory • Eradicate drug trafficking • Defend the rule of law and strengthen democratic order • Promote economic prosperity and social equity • Reconstruct the damaged social fabric
The Defense and Democratic Security Strategy provides a conceptual framework to justify U.S.
counterinsurgency support precisely because it unambiguously admits that the state currently lacks the ability to effectively govern the nation. Within this governance vacuum the drug trade and associated terror groups have flourished. Therefore, providing U.S. military assistance to the GOC in its efforts to wrest territorial control from the FARC, ELN or paramilitaries -whether involved in trafficking at the moment of tactical contact or not -is fundamental to precluding those same groups from providing safe haven to coca growers, criminal cartels or from sponsoring their own drug activities. More importantly, by designating its priorities as the protection of the citizenry, the consolidation of legitimate government authority and the enhancement of the rule of law and democratic institutions, The convergence between publicly voiced U.S. and Colombian interests and priorities is no serendipity, as U.S. authorities in both Washington and Bogota were instrumental developing the new Colombian strategy. However, it is unlikely this collaboration would have come to fruition absent changed U.S. perceptions about foreign terrorists' potential to strike domestically and the emergence of vigorous Colombian leadership committed to preserving and expanding democratic governance.
Although the Bush administration now has a clear definition of national interests articulated in the context of an broad engagement policy with Colombia, it is important to interject a note of caution before discussing the actual instruments of U.S. power and statecraft that will be employed. The terms of reference used to describe Colombia policy must continue to be cautious, qualified and always couched in the language of a long-term, protracted engagement. Successes must be cast relative to the enormity of the problem and failures must be both expected and openly recognized. An encouraging example of adherence to this "invest more; expect less" reality is found in a State-Defense Department joint report to Congress issued in February 2003.
As Colombia's deep-seated internal conflict dates back almost 40 years, it would be misleading to attempt to provide an expected time schedule for full achievement of United States objectives in the country. In other regions of the world such as Angola, Central America, South Africa and Eastern Europe, the United States has shown that with sustained engagement, accompanied by political will and courage, we have been able to respond successfully to entrenched conflicts. Full realization of U.S. policy goals will require a concerted Colombian strategy and effort --backed by sustained U.S. assistance over a period of years --to establish control over its national territory, eliminate narcotics cultivation and distribution, end terrorism, and promote human rights and the rule of law. 15
The Instruments of Colombia Policy Statecraft: Departing from the premise that there is no domestic support for direct military intervention in Colombia, and in view of the fact that the Government of Colombia is a friendly and willing partner in the execution of U.S. policy, our strategy of engagement will be primarily supported by mutually reinforcing sub-strategies of persuasion and cooperative diplomacy. This does not, however, rule out the use of coercive diplomacy in the application of U.S. instruments of power, as will be discussed in relationship to human rights issues. Congressional approval to make this legislation permanent, both as a strategic building block towards an FTAA and as a tangible demonstration of our long-term commitment to regional prosperity.
An historic and significant constraint on American assistance to Colombia has been the atrocious human rights performance of the Colombian government, in particular the police and military charged with conducting the counter drug and counterinsurgency missions we seek to support. The State Department's 2002 Human Rights Report remained highly critical, qualifying the government's overall record as "poor," despite ongoing government and NGO attempts to address chronic abuses that result from a dysfunctional judicial system and weak institutions. 19 The appalling human rights situation in Colombia has led to the growth of a well-organized, highly critical, non-governmental community in the United States and Europe which, linked with powerful congressional critics of U.S assistance to Colombia, has succeeded in placing restrictions on U.S. aid. Since 1997, "Leahy Law" provisions in both Defense and State appropriations have prohibited U.S. security assistance to foreign military units that violate human rights with impunity. 20 While in practice this has imposed onerous vetting requirements on State and DoD, according to many observers, the law has been the most effective legal tool in leveraging U.S. assistance to improve recipients' human rights performance. Accordingly, strict compliance with Leahy should be observed. Policymaking is never conducted in a political vacuum, especially policies that are borne of such closely linked domestic dilemmas such as drug abuse and the international situations that supply those narcotics. For this reason, it is both understandable and indispensable that the U.S. Congress play a critical role in the formulation and oversight of Colombia policy. Although not within the scope of this brief analysis to address Congress' role in depth, the legislative branch will continue to serve as both the source of funding to underwrite any engagement policy, but also as a constraint on executive branch implementation. As it seeks to balance "main street" constituencies concerned about drug usage and a more focused, academic and NGO policy elite worried about human rights in Colombia,
Congress must be fully factored into and consulted on any strategy regarding Colombia.
Another obvious risk to hands-on engagement is directly linked to a diminishing U.S. appetite to sustain current policy due to increasing U.S. casualties, both military and civilian in Colombia.
Three contract pilots are currently being held hostage by the FARC. American NGO members working with indigenous groups in Colombia have been murdered in the past. Our embassy has been attacked with anti-tank weapons and attempts to kill or kidnap diplomats and other high profile Americans are routine. The increased exposure to danger of U.S. personnel involved in training must not be underestimated, and all efforts must be made to minimize the attendant risks associated with a larger U.S. footprint in Colombia. In this regard, the current congressional caps on military and contract personnel should be maintained as a prudent means of limiting deaths and injuries to U.S.
personnel charged with executing this strategy. 21 Finally, the most insidious risk the Bush Administration confronts as it pursues its Colombia policy is that it becomes too inextricably linked with the person of President Alvaro Uribe. U.S.
policymakers often single out among foreign leaders those we assess to be "our guys." In the case of Uribe, it is not difficult to see why. A man of discipline and talent, a Colombian politician with no apparent history of corruption, and a patriot seemingly driven by a genuine desire for a better future for all Colombians, Uribe seems the perfect white knight with whom to partner. Yet U.S. strategists would be wise to recall that Colombia's tortuous problems have germinated over 60 years of violence, corruption and governmental ineffectiveness. Hence the potential solutions to them will go well beyond one democrat's four-year term of office. While we should certainly exploit the window of opportunity that Uribe's presidency offers, the real key to long-term progress in achieving the objectives of our and Colombia's common approach lies in developing Colombia's democratic institutions. And that is not a task that can be accomplished quickly, nor absent a comprehensive and sustained engagement policy that will guarantee future generations of Colombians similar commitments of resources and political support -at least until we "stop putting the stuff up our nose."
